

and the Mughal empires (Saleh, 1979; Barakat, 1977; Habib, 1985; Chandra, 1981). There is, moreover, additional evidence concerning peasant movements in pre-capitalist formations amongst the Indian (Habib, 1985; Chandra, 1981), the Egyptian (Barakat, 1977; Saleh, 1979) and the Syrian peasantry- of which Palestine was a part- (Scholch, 1982; Baer, 1969; Owen, 1981) which further refutes the validity of the AMP model.

Our study will demonstrate that Palestine under Ottoman rule, much like other Third World economies, was not devoid of private ownership of land. Gozansky's assumption that private ownership of land was absent, or, as she sometimes calls it "relatively absent" (1986:22), was not based on empirical data, but rather emerged as a necessary conclusion from the theoretical approach she employs. As will be demonstrated later in the study, the late nineteenth century land tenure system and forms of production in Palestine were a complex phenomenon which cannot be simply dismissed as "state property" (contra. Gozansky, 1986:25-27).

The understanding of the Indian land lord class, the "Zamindari" (Singh, 1985; Habib, 1985; Chandra, 1981), of the Egyptian "Muqata'jis" (Saleh, 1979; Barakat, 1977), of the Syrian "Multazims" (i.e., tax farmers), or of other local rural forms of land ownership (e.g., Mirs of Lebanon and "Heads of Hamulas" in Palestine), must be approached as specific historical examples and must be based on empirical evidence. This study will demonstrate that the Ottoman state was never the strong 'absolutist' state described in the AMP model. In the early nineteenth century, internal and external economic and political pressures were already evident. These forces left their imprint on the