

In this sense, the military labor force can be simultaneously in and not-in the civilian labor force. Also, as a result of this definition, the absorption into the military indirectly provides the masking of unem-ployment.

As a case in point, Quarterly Economic Review - Israel reports:

"...as the risk of unemployment grows, unemployment in fact fell from 3.5 percent in the first quarter of 1975 to 3.0 in the second. Such slack as existed was still being masked by the demands of the military service which had absorbed the surplus population (115,000 since 1973); while the labor force had expanded during the same period by only 35,000." ³⁵

Another evidence of the correlation between military mobilization and the masking of unemployment is illustrated by Ibrahim Oweiss in Table 4 and Figure 3, showing that unemployment reached its highest level prior to the 1967 War. A drastic decline in unemployment occurred immediately in the third quarter of 1967, which was followed by a steady decline until it reached a full employment zone.³⁶ Oweiss is thus also saying that in Israel, war efforts not only absorb a substantial part from the labor supply, hence masking unemployment rates, but also (especially when accompanied by territorial expansion) they stimulate production, thus creating further demand for labor; and further, the increase in military production generates even more jobs. The correlation between militarization and promoting employment multiplier effect has been best demonstrated in the American economy (Leontief) and the world economy (Kidron).

This brings us directly to the next point, which is the difficulty involved in distinguishing the civilian from military labor force, resulting from the increasingly systematic and comprehensive integration of civilian and military production since the 1967 War.